Cases to know before 1L.

Hadley hired Baxendale, a carrier, to deliver a broken mill crankshaft for repair. Baxendale delayed, the mill sat idle, and Hadley sued for the lost profits from the shutdown.

Whether a breaching party must pay for losses it could not have foreseen when the contract was made.

Consequential damages are recoverable only if they arose naturally from the breach or were within the parties' contemplation when contracting — the foreseeability limit on contract damages.

Dr. McGee promised young George Hawkins a "one hundred percent good hand" after a skin-graft operation to repair burn scarring. The operation failed, and hair grew on Hawkins's palm from the chest-skin graft.

How to measure damages when a doctor guarantees a result and the result isn't achieved.

Expectation damages: the difference between the value of what was promised and what was delivered — putting the plaintiff in the position promised, not merely refunding costs.

Over drinks at Zehmer's restaurant, Zehmer wrote on a restaurant check that he would sell his farm to Lucy for $50,000, and both Zehmers signed. Zehmer later claimed the whole thing was a joke.

Whether a person can avoid a contract by claiming he was joking when his words and conduct looked serious to a reasonable person.

Contract formation uses an objective test: what matters is what a reasonable person would believe from outward words and conduct, not hidden subjective intent.

Railroad guards helped a rushing passenger board a moving train, dislodging his package — which contained fireworks. The explosion toppled a scale many feet away, injuring Helen Palsgraf.

Whether the railroad owed a duty to an unforeseeable plaintiff injured by an unforeseeable chain of events.

Negligence is relational: a defendant is liable only for harm to foreseeable plaintiffs within the scope of the risk. "Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do" (Cardozo, C.J.).

MacPherson bought a Buick from a dealer (not from Buick). A defective wooden wheel — made by another company but installed by Buick — collapsed, injuring him. Buick argued it owed him no duty because they had no contract with each other.

Whether a manufacturer owes a duty of care to a remote buyer with whom it has no contract (no "privity").

If a product is "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made," the manufacturer owes a duty to foreseeable users regardless of privity — demolishing the privity barrier in negligence.

Brian Dailey, age five, moved a lawn chair just as Ruth Garratt was sitting down. She fell and fractured her hip. The trial court found Brian meant no harm.

Whether a child can have the "intent" required for battery when he didn't desire to cause harm.

Intent for battery is satisfied by acting with purpose or with knowledge to a substantial certainty that harmful or offensive contact will result — even without a desire to injure.

Attorney Mitchell sued the absent Marcus Neff in Oregon for legal fees, serving him only by newspaper publication, won a default judgment, and sold Neff's Oregon land — which ended up with Sylvester Pennoyer. Neff sued to get it back.

Whether a state court can enter a binding personal judgment against a nonresident never personally served within the state.

Due process requires personal service on a defendant within the state (or attachment of in-state property at the outset) for personal jurisdiction — the territorial foundation of jurisdiction law.

International Shoe, a Delaware corporation based in Missouri, employed salespeople in Washington but claimed it wasn't "present" there and refused to pay into the state's unemployment fund.

Whether a state can hale an out-of-state corporation into its courts consistent with due process.

Personal jurisdiction requires "minimum contacts" with the forum such that suit "does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" — the modern test that replaced Pennoyer's rigid territorialism.

Harry Tompkins, walking beside railroad tracks in Pennsylvania, was struck by a train. He sued the New York railroad in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, hoping federal "general law" would be friendlier than Pennsylvania's trespasser rule.

Whether federal courts in diversity cases may apply their own "general" common law instead of state law.

"There is no federal general common law." Federal courts apply state substantive law — including state court decisions — in diversity cases, ending nearly a century of forum-shopping under Swift v. Tyson.

Cleveland police forced their way into Dollree Mapp's home without a valid warrant, looking for a bombing suspect, and instead found allegedly obscene materials — which became the basis of her conviction.

Whether evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be used in a state criminal trial.

The exclusionary rule applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment: unconstitutionally seized evidence is inadmissible in state court, overruling Wolf v. Colorado.

Ernesto Miranda confessed to kidnapping and rape after two hours of police interrogation without being told he could remain silent or have a lawyer. The confession convicted him.

Whether the Fifth Amendment requires police to warn suspects of their rights before custodial interrogation.

Before custodial interrogation, police must warn suspects of the right to remain silent, that statements can be used against them, and the right to counsel (appointed if indigent) — the famous Miranda warnings.

Detective McFadden watched John Terry and two others pace and peer into a store window repeatedly, suspecting they were casing it for robbery. He stopped them, patted down Terry's coat, and found a gun.

Whether a brief stop-and-frisk on less than probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.

An officer may briefly stop a person on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and frisk for weapons on reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous — the Terry stop.

Lodowick Post was hunting a fox with his hounds on a Long Island beach when Jesse Pierson intercepted, killed, and carried off the fox. Post sued, claiming the chase gave him ownership.

Whether pursuing a wild animal creates a property right in it.

Mere pursuit does not create ownership of a wild animal; possession requires actual capture (or mortal wounding plus continued pursuit) — the rule of capture.

Johnson's heirs claimed Illinois land bought directly from Native tribes in the 1770s; M'Intosh claimed the same land via a later purchase from the United States government.

Whether private individuals can acquire valid title by purchasing land directly from Native tribes.

Under the discovery doctrine, the discovering European sovereign (and its successor, the United States) held ultimate title; tribes retained only a right of occupancy, so private purchases from tribes conveyed no valid title.

Steenberg Homes, delivering a mobile home, deliberately cut across the Jacques' Wisconsin field after being repeatedly refused permission. The jury awarded $1 in nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages; lower courts threw out the punitive award.

Whether punitive damages can stand on nominal damages alone for an intentional trespass.

Yes: the right to exclude is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights," and punitive damages may vindicate it even where only nominal harm occurred — otherwise trespass would cost trespassers $1.

William Marbury's commission as a justice of the peace, signed by President Adams, was never delivered after Jefferson took office. Marbury asked the Supreme Court to order Secretary of State Madison to deliver it.

Whether the Supreme Court could issue the writ — and whether an act of Congress conflicting with the Constitution must yield.

"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" — establishing judicial review: courts may strike down laws that violate the Constitution.